


Authentication and Authorization


The Grid Security Infrastructure
and its implementation
in DutchGrid and DataGrid Test Bed 1

David Groep, NIKHEF




Overview

- Mechanisms for authentication
 - public key encryption; SSL and PGP
 - Certification Authorities
- Authentication in GSI and EDG Test Bed 1
 - your identity certificate
 - proxies and delegation
- Authorization in Test Bed 1
 - **As a user**: how do I get in?
 - **As an admin**: who can get in, how do I let people in?



Authentication

- The need to establish the identity of your partner (user *or* system)
- Options
 - just a name (username or DNS name)
 - fixed username/password
 - one-time passwords/tokens (cryptocard, DigiPass,...)
 - **identity certificates** in a `web-of-trust`
 - **identity certificates with trusted third parties**





secure communications using public key crypto

- **conventional** (symmetric) secure communication:
both parties need a pre-existing trusted channel
- **Asymmetric encryption** ('public key crypto')
allows secured communication
without need for channel to share a secret
- You can reliably establish communications
between two key pairs
- Relies on a (supposedly) difficulty problem,
e.g., factoring large numbers

How does it work?

- Example 1:





6-bit RSA key generation

- Take a (small) value $e = 3$
- Generate a set of primes (p, q) , each with a length of $k/2$ bits, with $(p-1)$ prime relative to e .
 $(p, q) = (11, 5)$
- $\phi(p, q) = (11-1)(5-1) = 40$; $n = pq = 55$
- find d , in this case **27** [$3 \cdot 27 = 81 = 1 \pmod{40}$]

- Public Key: **(3, 55)**
- Private Key: **(27, 55)**


$$E_{e,n}(m) = m^e \pmod{n}$$

$$D_{d,n}(c) = c^d \pmod{n}$$

$$m = D(E(m)) = E(D(m)) \quad (\text{reversibility})$$

$$\text{if a.o. if } de = 1 \pmod{\phi(p, q)}$$


$$\text{where } \phi(p, q) = (p-1)(q-1)$$



Message Exchange

Encryption:

- Bob thinks of a plaintext $m(<n) = 18$
- Encrypt with Alice's public key **(3,55)**
- $c = E_{3;55}(18) = 18^3 \bmod(55) = 5832 \bmod(55) = 2$
- send message "2"



Decryption:

- Alice gets "2"
- she knows private key **(27,55)**
- $E_{27;55}(2) = 2^{27} \bmod(55) = 18 !$

$$E_{e,n}(m) = m^e \bmod(n)$$


$$D_{d,n}(c) = c^d \bmod(n)$$

$$m = D(E(m)) = E(D(m))$$

$$\text{if a.o. if } de = 1 \bmod(\phi(p,q))$$


$$\text{where } \phi(p,q) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

- If you just have (3,55), it's hard to get the 27...




What can be done?

- **Confidentiality**
no-one but the recipient can read what you say
- **Message integrity**
*encrypt a digest of your message
with a private key*
- **Non-repudiation**
similar to integrity
- This encryption works both ways with 2 key pairs



From crypto to trust?

- You establish communication between key pairs **but not between entities!**
- **Binding** needed between key pair and an identity (*this is implicit in symmetric solutions, but not here!*)
- in a trusted way ...
- Distributed trust models (PGP)
- **Hierarchical (authoritarian) model (PKI)**



PKI and the CA

- The PKI Certificate `X.509`
 - structured message with:
 - public key
 - identifier(s)
 - digitally signed by a trusted third party
- Certification Authority (CA)
 - binds user-supplied identifiers to a public key
 - in accordance with a defined **Certification Policy**
 - following the guidelines of a **Certification Practice Statement**

Identity Certification

Alice



(d,n)

Certificate Request

(e,n)
CommonName='Alice'
Organization='KNMI'

Alice generates key pair and ships 'request' to CA

CA checks identifiers against identity of requestor

Alice...



ship to Alice and publish



sign request with CA key

CA key
CA cert
(self-signed)





An example certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 1 (0x1)

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=NL, O=NIKHEF, CN=NIKHEF medium-security certification auth

Validity

Not Before: Feb 20 13:29:27 2001 GMT

Not After : Feb 20 13:29:27 2002 GMT

Subject: O=dutchgrid, O=users, O=nikhef, CN=David Groep

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)

Modulus (1024 bit):

00:ce:d7:1f:04:b4:50:eb:1b:da:ab:c7:db:ec:d9:

. . . .

f0:47:79:1e:3b:94:62:76:55

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:FALSE

Netscape Comment:

This CERT was issued under the NIKHEF medium...

X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

URI:<http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/cacrl.pem>

Netscape CA Policy Url:


<http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/policy/>

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

14:6f:c3:8f:36:6d:41:48:f9:01:b2:48:f3:62:7a:a0:e3:52:

. . . .

0e:d2:85:65



Common Policy Items

- EU DataGrid CA's adhere to **minimum standards**:
- Check identity of requestor by
 - **personal appearance** before Registration Authority
 - **voice recognition** for people the RA knows
- Identifiers corresponds to `official' name (nat. ID)
- Affiliation is required and known to be correct
- Issues certificates for `local region' only



CA Acceptance Matrix

CA Acceptance Matrix

Also see: [CA Feature Matrix](#)

User's CA:
User:
ROWS: inspecting CA
COLUMNS: inspected CA
Click on:
[entry] to get critique of inspected CA by inspecting CA
row [inspecting CA] to get ALL critiques BY that CA
column [inspected CA] to get critiques OF that CA

category of inspected CA by inspecting CA:
blank = inspected CA not yet inspected by inspecting CA
0 = severe issues outstanding
1 = major issues outstanding
2 = minor issues outstanding
3 = no issues outstanding
red = CA's certificate or CRL nearly expired
flashing = CA's certificate or CRL expired

	D	A	T	G	R	I	N	F	I	N	F	I	D	N	O	R	D	I	N	D	I	D	P
Switzerland(CERN)	X																						
Czech(CESNET)	X																						
France(DataGrid.fr)	X																						
Spain(DATAGRID-ES)		X																					
Russia(DataGrid)			X																				
Netherlands(NIKHEF)				X																			
Ireland(Grid-Ireland)					X																		
Italy(INFGrid)						X																	
Portugal(LIPGrid)							X																
Scandinavia(NorduGrid)								X															
UNQUNHEP)									X														

About CA Acceptance Matrix About CA Reports

Overview of all EDG CA's

Aid for site admins to establish trust in the various CA's

From WP6/CA web site
<http://marianne.in2p3.fr/>

Also list of features
by Brian Coughlan (TCD)



Certificate Repositories

LDAP directory with all certificates → send mail or build VO's

The screenshot shows the LDAP Browser/Editor v2.8.1 interface. The main window displays a directory tree on the left and a table of attributes on the right. The selected entry is `cn=dommel.wins.uva.nl` under `ou=wins.uva.nl`, `o=hosts`, and `o=dutchgrid`. The attribute table shows the following data:


Attribute	Value
<code>userCertificate;binary</code>	BINARY (917b)
<code>ou</code>	wins.uva.nl
<code>objectClass</code>	top
<code>objectClass</code>	person
<code>objectClass</code>	inetOrgPerson
<code>o</code>	dutchgrid
<code>o</code>	hosts
<code>sn</code>	dommel.wins.uva.nl
<code>cn</code>	dommel.wins.uva.nl

A "View" window is open, displaying the following certificate information:

Certificate Info


Subject: CN=dommel.wins.uva.nl, OU=wins.uva.nl, O=hosts, O=dutchgrid
Issuer: CN=NIKHEF medium-security certification auth, O=NIKHEF, C=NL
Validity From: Wed Apr 04 16:08:36 GMT+02:00 2001
To: Thu Apr 04 16:08:36 GMT+02:00 2002
Sig. Algorithm: MD5withRSA **Serial Number:** 15 **Version:** 3

Buttons: 917b, Save as, OK



Getting your own certificate

- On a DataGrid testbed system:
 - initialize your environment
 - type `grid-cert-request`
 - mail it to ca@nikhef.nl
 - the CA will get back to you
- For all other certs (from any system):
 - Go to <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/>
 - Use the **Build-a-Cert** interface
 - Have a command prompt handy with OpenSSL (for all of Unix, Linux and Win32!)




Storing your cert

- **Your private key is valuable, keep it safe**
 - protected with a pass phrase
(conventional symmetric crypto)
 - store it securely (e.g. on removable medium)
 - keep it private
 - never share with others
- **Find all your credential data in `$HOME/.globus/`**
 - Private key in “userkey.pem”
 - Public key certificate in “usercert.pem”
 - CA’s that **you** trust in “~/globus/certificates/” (if needed)




Your proxy

- you use a `proxy certificate` to authenticate
- derived from your `long-lasting` certificate
- limited validity (default 12 hours, can be longer)
- limits exposure of key pair
- limits the damage done when compromised
- get it with **grid-proxy-init**



Authorization


- Authorization deals with actual access to resources
- Various possible models (push, pull, agent)
see <http://www.aaaarch.org/>
- The GSI is *now* based on **per-resource access lists**
 - grid-mapfiles: map grid identifiers to local user ID's
- **In the future**
 - “token-based” authorization
 - based on agreements per user community
 - “Community Authorization Service” (CAS)



the grid-mapfile


- Local administrator remains `in control`
- this list, owned by root, determines who gets in

```
$ ssh polyeder cat /etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=David Groep" davidg
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Michiel Botje" h24
#"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=sara/CN=Ron Trompert" griduser
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Jeffrey Templon" aliprod
#
# alice testbed users
"/C=IT/O=INFN/L=Catania/CN=Roberto Barbera/Email=roberto.barb.....
"/O=Grid/O=CERN/OU=cern.ch/CN=Predrag Buncic" aliprod
"/O=Grid/O=CERN/OU=cern.ch/CN=Federico Carminati" aliprod
"/C=FR/O=CNRS/OU=SUBATECH/CN=Yves Schutz/Email=schutz@in2p3.fr" ...
"/C=IT/O=INFN/L=Torino/CN=PiergiorgioCerello/Email=Piergiorgio.....
```



The User: getting in the map

- Within the EU DataGrid context: **join a VO**
 - contact your WP manager or
 - your Experiment Coordinator(s):
<http://datagrid-wp8.web.cern.ch/datagrid-wp8/>
- Or contact the desired site administrator
 - state your Subject name
 - your local user name (if you have one)
 - and send lots of apple pie ☺ or equivalent
- Acceptable Use Policy/Contract (AUP) forthcoming
(only relevant for EDG, still under serious discussion)




The VO: making a directory

- The VO directory contains
 - People
 - Groups and Group Admins (group administrators)
 - A 'Super User' (VO Manager)

The screenshot shows the LDAP Browser/Editor v2.8.1 interface. The main window displays a tree view of the directory structure under the root `o=alice,dc=eu-datagrid,dc=org`. The tree includes `ou=protogroup`, `ou=admin`, and `ou=People`. Under `ou=People`, several entries are listed, including `cn=Roberto Barbera`, which is currently selected. The right pane shows the details for this entry, including the email address `roberto.barbera@ct.infn.it` and various object classes like `person`, `organizationalPerson`, `inetOrgPerson`, and `pkiUser`. A smaller 'View' dialog box is open in the foreground, providing a detailed view of the selected entry's attributes and values.


Attribute	Value
mail	roberto.barbera@ct.infn.it
labeledURI	ldap://security.fi.infn.it/cn=Roberto Barbera,o=infn,c=it?userCertificate
description	subject= /C=IT/O=INFN/L=Catania/CN=Roberto Barbera/Email=roberto.barbera@ct.L...
objectClass	person
objectClass	organizationalPerson
objectClass	inetOrgPerson
objectClass	pkiUser
objectClass	Barbera

Attribute	Value
objectClass	person
objectClass	organizationalPerson
objectClass	inetOrgPerson
objectClass	pkiUser
mail	roberto.barbera@ct.infn.it
labeledURI	ldap://security.fi.infn.it/cn=Roberto Barbera,o=infn,c=it?userCertificate
description	subject= /C=IT/O=INFN/L=Catania/CN=Roberto Barbera/Email=roberto.barbera@ct.infn.it
sn	Barbera
cn	Roberto Barbera




VO Tools: VOP


- Add People to a VO
- based on
CA Directory
- Can be run by
VO Managers
- *cert2ldif*



VO tools: Group


- Add VO members to a group
- Can be run by group admins





The Admin: making the map

1. You can add users by hand: tedious&trusted
 2. You can get lists of users from the VO's:
tedious & somewhat less trusted (group accounts)
- If you have chosen for (2), you better use: **mkgridmap** from the EDG Authorization group
 - Based on VO-maintained user lists
 - retain lots of local control over configuration
<http://cvs.infn.it/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/Auth/mkgridmap/>



mkgridmap.conf

```
#### GROUP: group URL [lcluser]
group ldap://grid-vo.nikhef.nl/ou=omi,o=earthob,dc=eu-datagrid,dc=org tb2
group ldap://grid-vo.nikhef.nl/ou=mcprod,o=alice,dc=eu-datagrid,dc=org aliprod

#### ACL: deny|allow pattern_to_match
deny *L=Parma*
allow *O=INFN*
allow *CESNET*
deny *John*
allow *dutchgrid*

#### DEFAULT LOCAL USER
default_lcluser testbed1


##### GRID-MAPFILE-LOCAL
gmf_local /etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile-local
```



What can you do now?

```
kilogram:/user/davidg (davidg:emin) - triode.nikhef.nl VT
File Edit Setup Control Window Help
triode:davidg:1002$ grid-proxy-init
Your identity: /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=David Groep
Enter GRID pass phrase for this identity:
Creating proxy ..... Done
Your proxy is valid until Wed Nov  7 06:29:43 2001
triode:davidg:1003$ globus-job-run dommel.wins.uva.nl /bin/date
Tue Nov  6 17:30:25 GMT 2001
triode:davidg:1004$ gsincftp schuur.nikhef.nl
NcFTP 3.0.0 (March 20, 2000) by Mike Gleason (ncftp@ncftp.com).
Connecting to 192.16.199.22...
schuur.nikhef.nl FTP server (Version wu-2.6.1(1) [GSI patch v0.5] Tue Jun 26 10:
14:52 MET DST 2001) ready.
Logging in...
User davidg logged in.
Logged in to schuur.nikhef.nl.
ncftp /user/davidg >

triode:davidg:1005$
```



More Info?

<http://www.dutchgrid.nl/>